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Organizational Power Styles: 
Collective and Competitive Power 
under Varying Organizational Conditions* 
NANCY C. ROBERTS 
This article reports research on the extent to which managers exercise both competitive 
and collective power with bosses, peers, and subordinates and the extent to which this 
exercise is related to organizational factors such as resource availability, normative struc-
tures, and organizational form (Type A or Type Z). Based on data from a survey of 350 
managers from three levels of management in two businesses and two universities, the 
author finds that managers exercise both collective and competitive power in these organi-
zations, in all role relationships, and that the type of power exercised is associated with 
resource availability and organizational form. 
Recent work on organizational life calls 
for a broader definition and interpreta-
tion of the exercise of power. Studies of 
leadership emphasize the power of sym-
bolic and charismatic management to 
create an organizational vision, to build 
commitment toward the pursuit of the 
vision, and to energize members into ac-
tion (Berlew, 1974; House, 1977; Pfeffer, 
198la, b). Work on bargaining and nego-
tiation emphasizes the interdependence of 
organizational life and the power of cre-
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ating "win-win" solutions to problems 
(Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Fisher & 
Ury, 1983; Rubin & Brown, 1975). With 
its emphasis on shared power, decentral-
ized decision making, and worker in-
volvement, the Japanese style of man-
agement has received much praise in the 
management literature (Ouchi, 1981; 
Ouchi & Johnson, 1978). Definitions of 
power as the ability to get results (Kanter, 
•Tue author thanks Raymond Bradley and the 
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ments on earlier versions of this article. 
Nancy C. Roberts is an associate professor of 
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1977) and the capacity to affect organiza-
tional outcomes (Mintzberg, 1983) em-
phasize the energy-generating effects of 
power. Furthermore, case study reports 
comparing various power strategies note 
that coercive tactics are "noticeable chief-
ly by their absence"; instead, evidence re-
veals the importance of problem-solving 
skills and the ability to reach consensus in 
exercising power (Patchen, 1974, p. 216). 
These studies offer a perspective on 
power that differs from the traditional 
one. This alternate view assumes that a 
social actor derives power from collective 
and cooperative action, in which two or 
more actors pool their resources and join 
forces to work toward a common goal so 
that all are empowered (Craig & Craig, 
1974; Parsons, 1963; Pettigrew, 1973; 
Swingle, 1976). Power stems from collec-
tive rather than self-interested action. As 
social actors pool resources to accomplish 
common ends, power comes from choice 
and cooperation rather than from manip-
ulation or control. 
According to the traditional view, a so-
cial actor gains power from an imbalance 
or inequity between two or more social 
actors in a relationship. Strategies ranging 
from coercion to manipulation, to pres-
sure for conformity (Wrong, 1979) are 
used to maintain the imbalance. Thus, 
power is defined as the probability that a 
social actor can enforce her or his will 
despite resistance (Weber, 1974), as the 
amount of resistance that a social actor 
can overcome (Emerson, 1962), or as the 
amount of force or pressure one social 
actor can direct toward another, regard-
less of the other's response (Dornbush & 
Scott, 1975). The term "zero-sum" de-
scribes the process, as all social actors in 
the relationship cannot benefit mutually. 
Instead, one "wins" by overcoming the 
other's resistance, and by definition the 
lother "loses." This article uses the term 
competitive power to describe this un-
equal, imbalanced relationship between 
two or more social actors. 
In sum, the traditional view holds that 
one has power over others, with interac-
tions characterized as competitive, con-
trolling, directive, and adversarial. Such 
transactions have little room for collec-
tive, cooperative action, as exemplified in 
collective power, or power with others. 
HYPOTHESES 
Reports on power in organizations have 
been relatively recent additions to the 
management literature (Pfeffer, 1981 a, b ). 
The view that competitive power is the 
norm tends to predominate, with some 
key exceptions (Kanter, 1977; Mintzberg, 
1983). None of the work published to 
date, however, investigates the extent to 
which shared or collective power coexists 
with competitive power. To what extent 
are both collective and competitive power 
exercised in organizations? Does one type 
tend to predominate? If so, under what 
conditions? 
This article takes the position that all 
organizations are "mixed motive" in na-
ture (Kochan & Verma, 1983)-that is, 
that "participants share some common in-
terests and have some conflicting ones as 
well" (p. 19). Since organizations are sys-
tems that create dependency (Kanter, 
1977; Kotter, 1979), their members must 
cooperate and integrate their activities to 
accomplish the organizations' missions 
(Barnard, 1968). Members also labor 
under varying conditions of resource 
scarcity (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Time, 
energy, expertise, promotions, and mon-
ey are usually in greater demand than the 
organization can supply; thus, competi-
tion and conflict often result. 
A related issue is the use of both collec-
tive and competitive power with all mem-
bers of a manager's role set (Graen, 1976). 
Some have argued that a manager courts 
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danger in being competitive and directive 
with the boss (Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkin-
son, 1980), that although exhibiting com-
petitive behavior with subordinates and 
peers may be appropriate occasionally, 
acting in such a manner with those in 
authority runs counter to advice on man-
aging relations "upward" (Gabarro & 
Kotter, 1983). Despite these reservations, 
however, this article presents the argu-
ment that managers can and do compete 
with their bosses for rewards and recogni-
tion, just as they compete with others. 
Although the manager-boss relationship 
likely exhibits less competitive than col-
lective behavior because managers must 
cooperate with authority to obtain pro-
motions and rewards, some competition 
is likely to exist as well. The following 
hypothesis tests the assumption that or-
ganizational relations are "mixed motive" 
in nature (Kochan & Verma, 1983). 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Managers in all organizations 
exercise both collective and competitive power 
in working with bosses, peers, and subor-
dinates. 
Given the expectation that both com-
petitive and collective power are exercised 
in all organizations, the next step is to 
determine which factors likely promote or 
facilitate the exercise of one type of power 
rather than the other. My research ex-
plored three factors: the type of organiza-
tion, the extent to which resources are 
scarce or abundant, and the organiza-
tion's normative system. 
Studies have demonstrated that organ-
izations vary as to the means of influence 
used to exact compliance (Etzioni, 1975) 
and as to the total amount and distribu-
tion of power (Tannenbaum & Cooke, 
1980). A recent characterization of Type 
A and Type Z organizations (Ouchi, 
198 l ), although not a direct attempt to 
differentiate on the basis of power, pro-
vides the opportunity to compare the two. 
Type A organizations centralize con-
trol, maintain differences in status between 
workers and managers and among levels 
of management, and rely on authoritarian, 
top-down decision processes. Type Z or-
ganizations rely on strong cultures to in-
ternalize controls, reduce differences in the 
status of workers and management, and 
emphasize participative decision making 
as much as possible throughout the orga-
nization (Ouchi, 1981). The patterns of 
behavior suggested by Ouchi's typology 
lead to the following hypotheses. 
HYPOTHESIS 2a: Managers in Type Z organi-
zations exercise collective power more fre-
quently than do managers in Type A 
organizations. 
HYPOTHESIS 2b: Managers in Type A organi-
zations exercise competitive power more fre-
q uen tl y than do managers in Type Z 
organizations. 
Recent studies of the decline and scar-
city of resources have focused on organi-
zational adaptation and adjustment 
(Greenhalgh, 1983; Jick & Murray, 1982; 
Levine, 1978; Whetton, 1980; Zammuto 
& Cameron, 1982). Although evidence of 
managerial response to scarcity is sparse 
(Murray, Jick, & Bradshaw, 1983), some 
speculate that scarcity leads to the exer-
cise of competitive power as competition 
for resources increases (Deutsch, 1973; 
Kipnis, 1976; Krantz, 1985). To test this 
assumption in organizational settings, the 
following hypotheses were proposed. 
HYPOTHESIS la: Managers in organizations 
experiencing retrenchment and reductions in 
resources will exercise competitive power 
more frequently than will managers in organi-
zations with munificent resources. 
HYPOTHESIS 3b: Managers in organizations 
experiencing munificent resources will exercise 
collective power more frequently than will 
managers in organizations with scarce re-
sources. 
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The literature also suggests that an or-
ganization's norms, climate, and culture 
will have a differential effect on behavior 
related to power (Handy, 1976; Mowday, 
1978; Porter, Allen, & Angle, 1981; Zanzi, 
1981). For example, competitive business 
environments are thought to encourage 
competitive power and discourage com-
munity interests and cooperation (Kipnis, 
1976; Solman & Friedman, 1982). Not 
only do organizations face external com-
petition for economic survival, but man-
agers within these organizations compete 
for power, promotions, and rewards 
(Kennedy, 1980; Korda, 1975; Shorris, 
1981 ). Universities, however, have norma-
tive structures that have been character-
ized as collegial and based on the norms of 
consensus and community (Baldridge, 
1971; Beyer, 1982; Blau, 1974). These 
norms apply not only to faculty actions, 
but also extend to other members of the 
academic community, including students 
and nonacademic staff (Baldridge, 1971 ). 
Collective power is thus expected to be 
more prevalent in universities than in 
businesses. The following two hypotheses 
were advanced to test these ideas. 
HYPOTHESIS 4a: Managers in universities ex-
ercise collective power more frequently than 
do managers in businesses. 
HYPOTHESIS 4b: Managers in businesses ex-
ercise competitive power more frequently than 
do managers in universities. 
METHODS 
Setting and sample 
Four organizations in the San Fran-
cisco Bay area provided the sites for this 
cross-sectional field study. Two of the or-
ganizations are universities, and two are 
businesses with large research-and-
development components. Organization 
1, a research-oriented university, has a 
larger resource base than does Organiza-
tion 2. Organization 1, a private univer-
sity, also has considerable flexibility and 
control with respect to its finances, where-
as Organization 2, a public institution, has 
suffered major budget cuts during the 
1970s and 1980s and has had its expendi-
tures under constant legislative review. 
Both universities have research and edu-
cation missions, although the lack of re-
sources makes the public university less 
able to support its goals. 
Ouchi 's typology ( 1981) can be used to 
characterize Organizations 3 and 4, the 
two businesses, which actually were part 
of his original sample. Organization 3 re-
presents a Type Z organization, and Or-
ganization 4 a Type A organization. 
After permission to enter all four or-
ganizations was obtained, third-level 
managers-that is, managers of man-
agers-were contacted and asked to par-
ticipate in the study. The university man-
agers were not academics, but were 
comparable to business managers in var-
ious functional areas such as finance and 
personnel. They were selected to facilitate 
comparisons with the managers in the 
businesses. All third-level managers were 
selected based on their interest in the pro-
ject, the diversity and distinctiveness of 
their functions, and their supervision of 
people at two levels of management below 
them. Lists of the first- and second-level 
managers reporting to the third-level 
managers were compiled, and these indi-
viduals also were invited to participate in 
the study. 
A survey form was mailed to each 
manager along with a cover letter explain-
ing the research and assuring the man-
agers that their responses would remain 
confidential and anonymous. The man-
agers also received reply envelopes ad-
dressed to the researcher. The response 
rates were 90% for Organization I, 62% 
for Organization 2, 67% for Organization 
3, and 69% for Organization 4. Table 1 
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Table 1 
Size Characteristics of the Sample 






presents the size characteristics of the 
sample. 
MEASUREMENT 
The Power Styles Inventory (PSI) was 
used to measure how managers exercise 
power among the four organizations. 
Power styles, or work styles as they are 
called in the survey to avoid unnecessary 
cueing of respondents, are designed to 
measure both competitive and collective 
forms of power (Roberts, 1983). The PSI 
measures five different styles: directive, 
impression management, transactional, 
consensual, and charismatic (see Table 2). 
Respondents read untitled paragraphs 
that describe each work style, and then are 
asked to indicate what percentage of the 
time they use these styles when interacting 
with their bosses, peers, and subordinates. 
They also indicate the percentage of time 
their bosses, peers, and subordinates use 
these work styles with them. Respondents 
can also describe any "other styles" used 
in their interactions and indicate what 
percentage of the time they are employed. 
Data produced from this survey thus in-
cludes managers' self-reported data and 
data on others in the managers' role sets. 
The validity and reliability of the PSI have 
been established through tests of content 
validity, criterion-related validity, con-
struct validity, and test-retest reliability 
(Roberts, 1983). 
Sample size per management level 
I 2 3 
30 10 5 
32 20 9 
61 27 9 
90 44 13 --
213 102 35 
The directive and impression manage-
ment styles both assume a competitive 
orientation toward power. In using each 
style, the initiator anticipates facing re-
sistance from the other social actor in get-
ting an outcome. In some cases, more 
forceful and possibly coercive action will 
be necessary (a directive power style). In 
other cases, more covert, manipulative ac-
tion (an impression management style) 
will be called for (Roberts, 1983). 
The consensual and charismatic styles, 
however, assume a collective orientation 
toward power. The consensual style calls 
for joint problem solving and participa-
tive decision making to accomplish goals. 
The charismatic style energizes organiza-
tional members to participate in and be-
come committed to the goals of the 
charismatic person. In both cases, social 
actors join forces with others to accom-
plish goals they cannot achieve individu-
ally (Roberts, 1983). 
The transactional style can assume 
either a competitive or collective orienta-
tion toward power, depending on the in-
tention of the actor. A certain amount of 
cooperation is necessary for a transaction 
to occur, but competition can also drive 
the interaction as social actors vie for 
scarce resources. Research on bargaining 
and negotiating substantiates this dual 
perspective (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; 
Bazerman & Lewicki, 1983; Deutsch, 
1973; Rubin & Brown, 1975); therefore, 
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Table 2 





Transactional work style 
Style 3. 
Directive work style 
Style4. 
Consensus work style 
Style 5. 
Charismatic work style 
•see Roberts (1983). 
Work gets accomplished by working effectively behind the scenes. Some-
times it is best to take action without others' being aware of what is 
happening, so that quietly, and without fanfare, work can get done. Other 
times, it is best to get work accomplished by creating a favorable impression 
on others, either by complimenting them on their efforts and ideas, or 
presenting one's own work efforts, or giving praise and recognition to others 
for their efforts, which can be effective ways to get work accomplished. 
Work gets accomplished by building contacts and a network of support for 
one's efforts. Work is rarely accomplished without the assistance of others. 
Sometimes appeals to reason, logic, or emotion convince others to lend their 
support. Other times, exchanging one's resources (time, rewards, expertise) 
for others' resources (information, privileges, promotion) creates this base of 
support. Ultimately, work gets done through a bargaining and negotiation 
process, whereby people exchange valued resources to aid one another in 
task accomplishment. 
Work gets accomplished by exerting pressure on others to get it done. 
Whether one issues directives, orders, or makes demands, it is necessary to be 
forceful to get things accomplished. Sometimes it is important to remind 
people of the potential loss of their pay, privileges, or jobs to ensure that work 
is carried out. In other cases, just telling someone to do something is all that is 
required. Essentially, task accomplishment calls for a clear statement of 
expectations and careful follow-up. Work gets done by monitoring and 
reviewing others to ensure that work is completed. 
Work gets accomplished by utilizing certain problem-solving and decision-
making techniques. Listening skills, the acknowledgment of individual dif-
ferences, the utilization of each person's resources and contributions, the 
management of conflict, and the development of trust among people are all 
essential components of this decision-making process. Ultimately, work gets 
accomplished by attempting to create win-win situations for everyone. When 
people take part in decision making, assume responsibility, recognize the 
legitimacy of others' concerns, and search together for common goals and 
means to solve their problems, work gets done. 
Work gets accomplished by generating enthusiasm and commitment in 
others for task accomplishment. One develops this commitment by creating a 
vision of future possibilities and by giving others a sense of mission and 
purpose in their work. Sometimes one can generate this commitment in 
others by creatively using language and symbols. Other times,forging strong 
bonds of identification between individuals will strengthen this commitment 
and, by sheer weight of one's presence, energy, personality, and enthusiasm, 
one can energize others to action. 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Power Styles Focal Managers Report Using with 
Peers, Bosses, and Subordinates* 
Total (N = 347) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Organization I (N = 49) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Organization 2 (N = 61) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Organization 3 (N = 96) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Organization 4 (N = 146) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Used M.'ith peers Used with bosses Used with subordinates 
2 3 5 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 
17.08 21.50 7.05 30.66 18.27 21.34 20.60 4.00 32.31 16.40 14.56 12.98 13.44 30.32 23.19 
17.95 18.52 11.42 21.50 16.94 21.69 19.55 8.71 24.57 18.97 17.72 14.15 14.97 21.24 17.61 
20.84 23.89 6.71 27.fn 17.28 17.91 28.02 3.32 28.87 14.29 14.72 I0.14 15.62 27.71 24.99 
22.76 21.48 14.07 22.26 15.75 19.00 26.48 9.59 25.26 19.58 18.85 12.76 20.49 22.92 22.27 
21.71 21.11 6.74 29.60 17.83 31.07 16.64 2.92 30.20 16.21 20.97 15.60 12.23 28.27 19.21 
21.07 19.98 9.59 25.80 17.26 25.93 16.92 6.66 26.41 19.54 21.44 17.12 14.18 23.07 18.65 
14.93 22.44 7.41 30.90 18.62 18.27 19.68 5.69 33.79 16.06 13.77 13.31 12.43 30.35 23.66 
17.06 18.28 I0.30 18.91 16.16 20.38 17.20 10.35 23.74 16.74 17.37 13.72 14.33 21.20 16.13 
15.44 20.26 8.13 32.03 18.52 20.36 20.56 3.54 33.26 17.34 12.38 12.54 13.95 31.94 24.00 
14.94 17.13 12.00 21.00 17.78 20.39 19.11 7.90 24.20 20.01 15.29 13.40 13.77 19.99 16.43 
•Power styles: I= impression management, 2 =transactional. 3 =directive, 4 =consensual, 5 =charismatic 
the transactional style will not be classi-
fied as either competitive or collective. 
managers use with peers, bosses, and sub-
ordinates. Table 4 presents data on what 
the focal managers report peers, bosses, 
and subordinates use with them. These 
scores represent the percentage of the time 
the managers use each style with those in 
their role sets, and what percentage of the 
RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the means and standard 
deviations of the power styles that focal 
Table4 
Means and Standard Deviations for Power Styles 
Peers, Bosses, and Subordinates Use with Focal Managers* 
Total(N = 346) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Organization I (N = 43) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Organization 2(N = 61) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Organization 3 (N = 97) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Organization 4 (N = 145) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Used b.l' peers Used by bosses Used by subordinates 
2 3 4 2 5 2 4 5 
13.06 23.69 10.61 31.37 14.63 13.50 12.60 17.83 29.74 18.36 19.19 18.65 7.23 30.96 17.56 
15.69 19.07 16.42 21.93 15.19 16.51 14.29 22.41 24.37 18.50 18.96 17.41 13.oJ 21.91 15.99 
15.02 21.89 9.42 27.90 15.52 17.74 17.20 10.64 21.79 24.54 20.47 25.00 5.07 25.47 18.95 
20.95 21.28 16.93 24.59 17.19 19.52 19.00 17.37 22.79 24.01 18.92 21.90 9.73 17.69 18.69 
16.15 26.16 8.88 33.67 I0.01 13.88 11.84 18.95 32.33 12.fn 23.88 15.78 5.81 30.44 19.22 
17.94 22.29 17.31 23.39 10.80 15.90 12.20 23.72 29.50 13.01 23.02 13.48 11.30 23.64 17.05 
I0.70 22.06 12.13 31.98 17.44 13.98 11.57 16.34 31.59 19.06 19.44 17.34 I0.22 27.38 17.15 
12.61 17.79 18.66 20.93 17.37 16.29 14.74 21.10 23.62 17.78 18.49 17.20 17.25 19.77 14.69 
12.75 24.28 I0.68 31.03 14.43 11.79 12.19 20.56 29.90 18.58 16.69 18.83 6.52 35.11 16.72 
14.59 17.76 14.39 21.19 14.22 15.79 12.93 23.68 22.71 18.36 17.08 17.21 11.03 22.98 15.57 
*Power styles: I= impression management, 2 =transactional, 3 =directive. 4 =consensual. 5 =charismatic 
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time members of their role sets use each 
style with them. Managers in all four or-
ganii.ations report using both collective 
(consensual and charismatic) and compet-
itive (impression management and direc-
tive) power styles. They also indicate that 
their peers, bosses, and subordinates use 
both collective and competitive power 
styles with them. These findings support 
Hypothesis I. 
The responses also indicate that the 
consensual power style, which represents 
an example of collective power, is used 
more frequently than any other style mea-
sured by the PSI. (I found only one excep-
tion to this finding: Managers in the 
public university register a mean of 31.07 
for the impression management style and 
a mean of 30.20 for the consensual power 
style.) This same pattern also is found in 
Table 5 
Comparisons Among the Four Organii.ations: One-Way Analysis of Variance 0 
Persons wing style Style F-test Level of significance 
Managers with peers Impression management 2.718 .04* 
Transactional .SIO .68 
Directive .291 .83 
Consensual .792 .so 
Charismatic .095 .94 
Managers with bosses Impression management 4.870 .003** 
Transactional 3.342 .02* 
Directive 1.523 .21 
Consensual 1.356 .25 
Charismatic .341 .80 
Managers with subordinates Impression management 3.569 .01** 
Transactional 1.345 .26 
Directive .574 .57 
Consensual .748 .52 
Charismatic 1.302 .27 
Peers with managers Impression management 1.736 .16 
Transactional .901 .44 
Directive .494 .69 
Consensual .835 .48 
Charismatic 3.541 .02* 
Bosses with managers Impression management 1.964 .12 
Transactional 1.172 .32 
Directive 2.430 .06 
Consensual 1.723 .16 
Charismatic 3.375 .02* 
Subordinates with managers Impression management 2.300 .08 
Transactional 2.650 .OS* 
Directive 2.130 .10 
Consensual 3.554 .02* 
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the reports on others in the managers' role 
sets-that is, peers, bosses, and subordi-
nates use the consensual power style with 
the focal managers more frequently than 
any other style. 
Comparisons between the consensual 
and directive power styles are striking. 
Managers report in both the self-reported 
data and data on others in their role sets 
that the consensual style is used more fre-
quently than the directive style. The clos-
est the two styles come to each other is in 
Organimtion 4, the Type A business, for 
which the focal managers report that their 
bosses use the directive style with them 
20.56% of the time, and the consensual 
style 29.90% of the time. 
A comparison of the responses for the 
other power styles reveals the same pat-
tern. Only the managers in Organimtion 
1, the private university, report that 
another style is used nearly as frequently 
as the consensual style. These managers 
report that the transactional style is used 
28.02% of the time when they interact 
with their bosses and 25% of the time when 
their subordinates interact with them ver-
sus figures of 28.87% and 25.47% for the 
consensual style, respectively. 
Organizational fadon 
Table 5 reports findings that test the 
extent to which organizational factors in-
fluence the power exercised within an or-
ganization. The one-way analysis of 
variance reveals significant differences 
among the four organimtions with re-
spect to the following: the use of impres-
sion management with peers, bosses, and 
subordinates; the use of the transactional 
style with bosses; the subordinates' use of 
the transactional and consensual styles 
with the focal managers; and the peers' 
and bosses' use of the charismatic style 
with the focal managers. 
To investigate these organimtional dif-
ferences, contrast correlations were formed 
by setting up planned comparisons be-
tween the businesses and the universities, 
between the two universities, and between 
the two businesses. Dummy variables 
were created for the planned compari-
sons, and these dummy variables were 
correlated with each power style. The re-
sults presented in Table 6 demonstrate 
graphically how two units, no matter 
what their form, differ from each other 
with respect to the variable of interest-
hence the name "contrast correlations." 
Contrasts between the 
Type A and Type Z organiutions 
Contrasts between the Type A and 
Type Z organimtions center on two 
power styles. Focal managers in the Type 
A organimtion report that their bosses 
use the directive power style with them 
more frequently than do managers in the 
Type Z organimtion, as predicted. The 
managers in the Type A organimtion, 
however, also report that their subordi-
nates use a consensual power style with 
them more frequently than do managers 
in the Type Z organimtion. Moreover, 
managers in the Type Z organization re-
port using a directive power style with 
their bosses, and report that their subor-
dinates use a directive power style with 
them more frequently than do managers 
in the Type A organimtion. Thus, these 
findings provide only partial support for 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
Contrasts between organizations 
with munificent and scarce resources 
Contrasts between the two universities 
center on the use of the charismatic and 
impression management power styles. As 
predicted, focal managers in the resource--
munificent private university report using 
the charismatic style more frequently with 
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Table6 
Contrast Correlations Between the Businesses and Universities, 
































Persons using the style 
Managers with peers 
Managers with peers 
Managers with peers 
Managers with peers 
Managers with peers 
Managers with bosses 
Managers with bosses 
Managers with bosses 
Managers with bosses 
Managers with bosses 
Managers with subordinates 
Managers with subordinates 
Managers with subordinates 
Managers with subordinates 
Managers with subordinates 
Peers with managers 
Peers with managers 
Peers with managers 
Peers with managers 
Peers with managers 
Bosses with managers 
Bosses with managers 
Bosses with managers 
Bosses with managers 
Bosses with managers 
Subordinates with managers 
Subordinates with managers 
Subordinates with managers 
Subordinates with managers 
Subordinates with managers 
"Businesses = +I, univcrsities = - I 
•Private univcrsitics = +I, public univcrsities = - I 




subordinates, and their peers and bosses 
report using the charismatic style more 
frequently with them compared to man-
agers in the public university. Also in sup-
port of Hypotheses 3a and 3b, focal 
managers in the resource-scarce public 
university report using the impression 
management style with their bosses and 
subordinates more frequently than do 
managers in the private university. Con-
trary to these hypotheses, however, focal 
managers in the public university report 
Between the Between the Between the 
businesses and two Type A and 
universities" universities• Type Z businesses' 
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-12• -07 08 
-()4 13•• -04 
08 -02 10• 
09• -()4 -1s•• 
-07 -02 03 
that their bosses use the consensual style 
more frequently with them than do man-
agers in the private university. 
Contrasts between the 
universities and businesses 
The major difference between the uni-
versities and the businesses centers around 
the impression management power style. 
Managers in the universities report using 
the impression management style-com-
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petitive power-more frequently than do 
managers in the businesses. This associa-
tion holds for all role relationships, with 
the exception of focal managers' use of 
impression management with their bosses, 
and this too approaches significance. 
In addition, focal managers in the busi-
nesses report that their subordinates use 
the consensual style more frequently with 
them than do focal managers in the uni-
versities. Thus, the findings do not sup-
port Hypotheses 4a and 4b: Focal man-
agers in the businesses do not exercise 
competitive power more frequently than 
do focal managers in the universities, nor 
do focal managers in the universities exer-
cise collective power more frequently than 
do focal managers in the businesses. 
DISCUSSION 
Hypothesis 1 
The answer to the first question that 
guided this research is clear. Both collec-
tive power-in the form of consensual 
and charismatic power styles-and com-
petitive power-in the form of directive 
and impression management powerstyles-
are exercised in all four organizations and 
in all role relationships. This finding ap-
plies to focal managers' self-reported data 
and their reports on peers, subordinates, 
and bosses in their role sets. 
Evidence from this research also sub-
stantiates Patchen's findings (1974) of 
the high levels of consensual activity in 
political decisions. Only in one role rela-
tionship in one organization was any 
other style used as frequently as the con-
sensual power style. The emphasis on 
competitive power, which has been 
characteristic of the organization and 
management literature, may have tended 
to obscure the level of collective power 
present in organizations. Future research 
on the exercise of power may need to 
shift its focus accordingly. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
Predictions that managers in the Type 
Z organization exercise collective power 
more frequently than do managers in the 
Type A organization, and that managers 
in the Type A organization exercise com-
petitive power more frequently than do 
managers in the Type Z organization, are 
partially supported. Bosses of focal man-
agers in the Type A organization use a 
directive style of power more frequently 
than do bosses of focal managers in the 
Type Z organization. 
Contrary to the predictions, however, 
focal managers in the Type Z organization 
report using a directive style with their 
bosses and that their subordinates use a 
directive style with them more frequently 
than do focal managers in the Type A 
organization. Furthermore, focal manag-
ers in the Type A organization report that 
their subordinates use a consensual style 
with them more frequently than do focal 
managers in the Type Z organization. 
At first glance these latter findings may 
seem inconsistent with the characteriza-
tion of management behavior in Type A 
and Type Z organizations (Ouchi, 1981): 
Under certain conditions, greater collec-
tive power is exercised in the Type A or-
ganization and greater competitive power 
is exercised in the Type Z organization. 
One may interpret these findings in sev-
eral ways, however. The characterization 
of the two organizations may be inaccu-
rate, or the organizations so classified 
may have changed dramatically since the 
data were gathered in the I 970s. A review 
of the original work and the subsequent 
histories of these two organizations sup-
ports neither interpretation. 
A third explanation is that the Type A 
and Z typology provides an incomplete 
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description of the interactions among all 
role relationships. It is possible that the 
typology more accurately describes the 
downward, but not the upward, exercise 
of power. For example, subordinates' ex-
ercise of power with their bosses may not 
follow the same pattern as the bosses' ex-
ercise of power with subordinates. In more 
open, participative Type Z organizations 
that place less emphasis on authority, sub-
ordinates may be allowed-and even 
encouraged-to be more directive with 
their bosses, without facing reprimands or 
incurring penalties. Thus, the exercise of 
competitive power in a Type Z organiza-
tion would be more likely to flow up the 
hierarchy rather than down it. 
In Type A organizations, however, 
subordinates may choose to act more 
consensually with their bosses to counter-
act their bosses' more directive behavior 
with them. Using a directive style with 
their bosses would run counter to the 
norms of the authoritarian Type A sys-
tem, and could potentially escalate differ-
ences and provoke conflict. In such situa-
tions, consensual behavior may have a 
greater chance to temper the bosses' ac-
tion. Using this reasoning, one should find 
the more frequent upward exercise of col-
lective power in the Type A organization. 
In sum, these findings are interpreted to 
support rather than challenge the typol-
ogy of Type A and Z organizations. 
Greater elaboration on the upward exer-
cise of power (Mowday, 1978; Schlilit & 
Locke, 1982) is warranted, however, to 
supplement our understanding of behav-
ior in these two organizational forms. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
The predicted differences in the power 
exercised by managers in the resource-
munificent and resource-scarce university 
environments did emerge to a large 
extent. Managers in the resource-rich pri-
vate university report using the charis-
matic power style-a form of collective 
power-more frequently than do man-
agers in the resource.:Scarce public univer-
sity. Furthermore, as predicted, managers 
in the public university report relying on 
the impression management power style-
a form of competitive power-more fre-
quently than do their counterparts in the 
private university. Focal managers in the 
public university also report using a trans-
actional style with their subordinates 
more often than do focal managers in the 
private university. 
Two puzzles surface in comparing the 
use of transactional and consensual 
power styles in the universities, however. 
Focal managers in the private university 
more frequently report that they use the 
transactional style with their bosses and 
that their subordinates more frequently 
use this style with them than do focal 
managers in the public university. At the 
same time, focal managers in the public 
university more frequently report using 
the transactional style with their subor-
dinates than do focal managers in the 
private university. What accounts for this 
difference in the use of the transactional 
power style? 
Relying on the explanation in the pre-
vious section, this may be another case in 
which one must examine both the direc-
tion in which power is exercised and the 
amount of power exercised. For example, 
in the resource-munificent private univer-
sity, managers use the transactional style 
in an upward direction, whereas in the 
resource-scarce public university this style 
is used more frequently in a downward 
direction. In more resource-rich environ-
ments, subordinates may be encouraged 
to compete with those in authority in lay-
ing claim to existing resources (Kanter, 
1983). In organizations undergoing re-
trenchment, however, transactional be-
havior may flow downward as managers 
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attempt to eliminate "slack" by bargain-
ing and negotiating with subordinates. 
A second puzzle concerns the consen-
sual style that bosses in the resource-
scarce environment of the public uni-
versity use with focal managers. Although 
the data indicate that these bosses use the 
directive power style more frequently with 
focal managers, as predicted, it does not 
explain why they also use the consensual 
style more frequently than do bosses in 
the private university. 
One explanation comes from a study of 
a school district undergoing retrenchment 
(Roberts, 1984). To minimize the divisive-
ness and animosity that budget cutbacks 
usually provoke, school district leaders 
used collective power to make budget re-
duction decisions. The level of coopera-
tion and collective action among the 
district members was rare compared to 
that found in other studies of retrench-
ment (Krantz, 1985). Bosses of the focal 
managers in the public university may 
have made retrenchment decisions in the 
same manner, making a series of strategic 
and tactical decisions (Jick & Murray, 
1982) to involve their subordinates in con-
sensual decision making. Reinforcing the 
findings of Krantz (1985), the data from 
this study reveal that a more complex set 
of behaviors can emerge in response to 
resource scarcity. Under some conditions, 
and we need to determine what those con-
ditions are, collective power can charac-
terize interactions among organizational 
members. 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b 
The predicted differences in the exer-
cise of power in the businesses and the 
universities do not emerge from the data. 
According to the analysis, collective 
power is no more characteristic of rela-
tions in universities than in businesses. 
Indeed, the focal managers in the busi-
nesses report that their subordinates more 
frequently use a consensual power style 
and that their peers more frequently use a 
charismatic style with them than do focal 
managers in the universities. In addition, 
the focal managers in the universities re-
port using the impression management 
style in all role relationships more fre-
quently than do their counterparts in the 
businesses, contrary to predictions. 
At least two explanations exist for these 
findings. The first involves the contamina-
tion factor. The public university operates 
under cutback management (Levine, 
1978), so a comparison between universi-
ties and businesses is confounded by the 
effects of resource scarcity. This is clearly 
shown in Table J's comparison of the 
means of impression management for all 
relationships analyzed. The focal man-
agers of the public university report the 
highest level of impression management 
for all role relationships, with the ex-
ception of what they report their bosses 
use with them. Thus, the differences be-
tween the business and university man-
agers with respect to impression manage-
ment result from the condition of resource 
scarcity in the public university. Future 
research should control for this factor in 
making comparisons between organiza-
tional types. 
The contamination factor also is ap-
parent when reviewing the unpredicted 
findings for charismatic and consensual 
power styles. The focal managers in the 
Type Z organization report the highest 
levels of charisma, whereas focal manag-
ers in the resource-scarce public university 
report the lowest. In addition, the focal 
managers in the businesses report more 
frequent use of the consensual style by 
subordinates than do focal managers in 
the universities. This latter finding is 
primarily caused by the greater upward 
flow of consensual behayior in the Type A 
business. Thus, organizational type also 
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confounds the comparison between the 
businesses and universities. 
Overall, the unexpected findings in the 
comparison between universities and busi-
nesses can be explained by the contami-
nating effects of resource availability and 
organimtional form. 
An additional puzzle in the findings is 
why distributive power-in the form of 
impression management-is exercised 
more frequently by the private university 
managers in their relations with their 
peers. One possible explanation is that the 
striving for academic excellence in the 
private university spills over to affeet pro-
fessional staff relationships. A search for 
excellence may exacerbate competition in 
peer relations, already known for their 
competitiveness (Kanter, 1977, 1983). 
One could also surmise that in organi-
i.ations in which consensual norms pre-
dominate-or in which directive behavior 
is at least proscribed, as is the case with 
universities-managers will rely more on 
impression management or transactional 
power styles, rather than the directive 
style, to accomplish their goals. This rea-
soning assumes that a certain level of 
competitive power will be manifested in 
all organii.ations, but the particular style 
used to express competitive power will 
vary with the organii.ation 's normative 
structure. In the case of universities, man-
agers may not want to violate norms by 
using a directive style, and may instead 
choose impression management as a more 
covert, subtle means of expressing com-
petitive power. 
CONCLUSION 
Research on the exercise of collective and 
competitive power has yielded significant 
results in the comparisons among the four 
organimtions sampled. Care should be 
taken, however, in generalizing these find-
ings to other settings. Neither the four or-
ganii.ations examined nor the managers 
chosen to participate were randomly se-
lected. The degree to which the sample is 
representative cannot be ascertained. More-
over, the data obtained are perceptual mea-
sures; no attempt was made to relate the 
measures to actual behavior. Finally, the 
sample consisted of the first three levels of 
management; generalizations cannot be 
made about other management levels. 
Given these caveats, the following 
summary stratements can be made. Col-
lective and competitive power exists in all 
organii.ations and in all role relationships, 
supporting the "mixed motive" perspec-
tive on organii.ational behavior. The re-
sults are consistent among the four 
organii.ations examined and among all 
peer, boss, and subordinate relations. 
Most important, this pattern appears for 
both the self-reported data and the data 
on others in the focal managers' role sets. 
The exercise of competitive and collec-
tive power varies with respect to two or-
ganizational factors: organii.ational form 
(Type A and Type Z) and the level of 
resource availability. Greater resource 
scarcity tends to be associated with greater 
frequency of competitive power, whereas 
greater resource munificence tends to be 
associated with greater frequency of col-
lective power. The Type Z organii.ation 
tends to exhibit less of a downward and 
more of an upward flow of competitive 
power in the hierarchy, whereas the Type 
A organii.ation tends to exhibit a greater 
downward flow of competitive power and 
a greater upward flow of collective power. 
Future study should continue the search 
for additional organii.ational factors as-
sociated with the exercise of collective and 
competitive power. Besides organii.ational 
type and resource availability, the level of 
conflict is expected to be associated with 
the greater exercise of competitive power. 
Our attention should also focus on those 
cases in which collective power is exer-
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cised, despite greater resource scarcity 
and potential for conflict (Roberts, 1985). 
An important challenge is to sort out with 
greater precision the conditions under 
which collective and competitive power 
are exercised. 
Another critical question that needs to 
be addressed is the relationship between 
managerial effectiveness and the exercise 
of power. Is the exercise of power related 
to effectiveness and is the exercise of one 
type of power more effective than the 
other? Based on this initial work, the re-
search agenda is a full and challenging one 
for the future. 
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